One of the most important military jobs in the world today is being handled by the Seventh United States Army's three Armored Cavalry regiments.

   Sitting astride the rugged, mountainous terrain along the border that separates the United States area of responsibility in Germany from Soviet Satellite Czechoslovakia and the Soviet zone of Germany these three regiments are charged with the tremendous responsibility of alerting Seventh Army, and the rest of the world, in case of attack.

   To accomplish this vital mission, personnel of the regiments must be constantly on the move, watching, listening, scouting, patrolling day and night, month after month and year after year.

   The alert, when and if it comes, must come swiftly and surely. A delay of a few minutes may mean the difference between victory and defeat. There can be no relaxation, no let down, no half-way measures. Personnel and equipment must be in top shape constantly.

   No other units in the United States Army today, except for those in Korea, have an actual tactical mission to perform, and few units any where have a mission of such import to the whole free world.

   It was no accident that armored cavalry regiments were chosen for the task. It is a traditional cavalry mission, and one which they are equipped and able to perform well. The capabilities needed for the border mission are almost precisely those set forth in the armored cavalry regiment Table of Organization and Equipment, 17-51R. They are:

1.      To operate as a light armored task force in security and light combat missions, without reinforcement.

2.      To operate as a highly mobile task force when suitably reinforced.

3.      To execute screening and counter reconnaissance missions.

4.      To reconnoiter for higher echelons, normally by independent action without reinforcement.

   Their TO&E mission is to operate as a light armored force in security, light combat and reconnaissance missions, and this role is precisely the mission they have toda

    In performing this mission, the three regiments involved, the 3rd, 11th and 14th, have over 500 miles of border to watch, and in order to more fully understand the problems with which they are faced, a knowledge of some of the conditions which exist is necessary.

   Along this very formidable front, the three regiments are deployed not necessarily as they would like to be, but as they must be because of the location of troop housing. In some cases this actually puts a battalion behind the regimental headquarters and many many miles away, both from the regimental headquarters and from the border it is expected to guard.

   The entire border for which Seventh Army is responsible is generally mountainous, rugged terrain. Roads do not always follow the border, and usually they are in poor condition.

   East and West methods of marking the border are a stark revelation of the basic philosophic difference between the Communist and the Free worlds. Lets look first at the Communist side of this border.

   Indicating the border exactly from one end to the other are white stone markers. Next, along the East German border, and at some locations along the Czech border, comes a plowed strip several yards wide. This strip is kept raked, and the purpose seems to be to detect signs of border crossers who may have slipped through other barriers.

    Hundreds of towers have been erected all along the border on the Communist side and most are mutually supporting. Here again, there is no pattern for manning the towers. Some appear to be manned all the time and some appear never to be manned.

   Where they exist, the fences and the plowed strip are maintained in good repair. Guards are often observed repairing the fences and raking the plowed strip.

   Little farming is permitted along the Czech border and entire villages within a mile of the border have been evacuated or razed. Some of the farm buildings are now used by the Czech guards.

   East German farmers, however, cultivate their fields in most cases right up to the border and villages close to the border appear to be intact.

   On the Western side the situation is entirely different. Except where there are old roads leading to the border, the only indications a border exists are the white stone markers and signs in German which read "Landes Grenze" meaning "State Border", placed at intervals alongside the stone markers. For American personnel we have in addition erected along each all-weather road signs which read "Attention! 50 Meters to the Border". Also on these roads, German customs officials have placed a simple wooden bar. And that's all. No plowed strip, no barbed wire fences, no towers.

   Although methods of marking the border may differ between East and West, vigilance does not. Observation posts dug into the hills all along the border are manned constantly by men of Seventh Army's three armored cavalry regiments.

   Five man motorized patrols move constantly between border camps and the observation posts.

   The border patrols check not only with our own camps and OPs, but with the German border security police and with German customs officials. Information is exchanged each time.

   It becomes fairly obvious, without mentioning other factors, that the border mission is no part time job.

   And if all this were not enough, the cavalrymen are constantly faced with harassing phenomena from the other side of the border. One OP reported 160 flares fired in 45 minutes and lesser pyrotechnic displays are not unusual. This seems to be a favorite way for the Communist border guards to communicate with each other. Sounds of rifle fire often punctuate the border night, and thin fingers of searchlights probe incessantly for information.

   Despite all this, the more homely aspects of military life must go on.

   Maintenance must still be performed. Training must be given. Supplies must be drawn and issued. Personnel problems must be solved.

   How to do these things efficiently has always been a matter to be reckoned with, and we have recently made some organizational changes in the armored cavalry regiments which we think have improved their ability to perform mission and at the same time to function better in more conventional pursuits.

   In our reorganization of the regiments we also considered the problem of furnishing adequate and timely logistical support to the regiments from the outside. With an actual tactical requirement to fulfill, the regiments could not tolerate the delays in support which sometimes occur. We felt it necessary to see that this support was always there at the precise time it was needed, and so during the last half of 1957, we attached to each regiment three additional service elements. These are a reduced strength direct support ordnance company, a full strength armored medical company and a full strength armored engineer company. These units live and train with the regiments and so become part of the team. They learn the mission, the terrain and the operational requirements of the regiment they must support.

   In addition to the foregoing modifications and innovations, some important substitutions and additions in equipment have also been made, especially in tanks and airplanes.

   The TO&E provides for M41 tanks in the reconnaissance companies and M48s in the tank companies of the regiments. We have replaced all the M41s with M48s. The obvious advantages of better protection by heavier armor, better antitank capabilities, longer range and increased firepower far outweigh the almost no decrease in tactical mobility occasioned by the change.

   Logistical problems are also somewhat simplified since ammunition, repair and maintenance are standardized, and fewer types of ammunition must be handled.

   In aircraft, too, we have attempted to increase the capabilities of the regiments. Besides the daily border patrol missions all aircraft fly if weather permits, armored cavalry regimental commanders rely heavily on them for moving equipment, for emergency use as radio relay stations and for normal passenger flights.

   To the TO&E authorization of eight L19s we first added an H13 helicopter to permit the commanders to perform transportation jobs they could not perform as well with other means.

   Aside from getting the regimental commander quickly to command posts and border stations inaccessible to fixed wing aircraft, the helicopter has proven invaluable, especially in winter, in evacuating injured or ill soldiers from their border posts in the mountains.

   More recently, we have authorized each regiment to replace one L19 with an L20. This will give them the additional load and passenger carrying capacity they have long needed, and will provide an all-weather capability not present before.

   These L20s are now on hand, and will be issued to the regiments as soon as installation of the new ARC-44 radios has been completed.

   Finally, I want to discuss the methods used by the regimental commanders in accomplishing the mission of keeping the border under observation at all times.

   Methods of operation vary somewhat among the three regiments, and the differences are determined largely by the distance the units are located from the Iron Curtain border.

   Battalions of the 14th, for example, are housed close enough to the border to permit company commanders to send out the necessary patrols from garrison locations.

   The 3d and the 11th are not so fortunate. The distance from the border here dictates that complete companies be moved from garrison to border camps. From these camps the units operate the patrols and observation posts. In all three regiments the border patrol mission is rotated between companies so that each company has an equal amount of time on the border.

   The 3d and the 14th have both assigned sectors of responsibility to all three of their battalions. The battalion commanders are responsible for the border operation of their particular sector, and they run the whole operation with their own personnel and equipment. In each of these regiments, a small number of additional personnel have been added to the S2 Section to handle the increased work load imposed at regimental headquarters by the border operation.

     The 11th, on the other hand, prefers to handle the complete border operation from regimental headquarters, and has established a separate staff section for the purpose. Until January 1958, this section was separate from the others and its chief reported directly to the commander. In January, the border section, still with the same responsibilities, was combined with the S2 Section.

     All too briefly I have outlined the major changes we in Seventh Army have felt it necessary to make in the organization of our three armored cavalry regiments, and as much of their methods of operation as is unclassified. These represent the collective judgment and empirical data gathered over a good many years of actual operation.

   One more point demands mention. The tremendous responsibility placed upon these three regiments presents challenges of leadership available in few other units. The officers and men of the regiments live every day with the knowledge that if armed aggression comes it will come to them first. There will be no time for correcting mistakes, no time for checking the book to see what to do. The everyday training must be superior, and it must be worked into a schedule already tightly filled with a very real tactical mission. Because of the physical separation of units and because of their individual missions, the training task rests squarely on the shoulders of the company, platoon, section and squad leaders. The opportunities for professional mental and moral growth in an assignment are without parallel.

     Perhaps because of this very situation, the esprit de corps and efficiency of these units are of an excellence to be envied. I am sure every man knows what would be demanded of him if aggression came.

     I am just as sure, from my own observations, that the armored cavalry regiments of the Seventh United States Army are trained and equipped to perform the vital military mission with which they have been charged.

ARMOR, May-June 1958  (We are grateful to Mr. Walter Elkins for transcription of this article)