(1) As in previous years, the regiment continued its two basic missions: first, conduct surveillance operations along the East-West German border in the zones forward of the V US Corps and of the II GE Corps; and second, be prepared to execute (in event of a Warsaw Pact attack) covering force missions forward of the V US Corps and, until relieved by Bundeswehr units, forward of the II GE Corps. Then, in 1968, the US established a nuclear weapons storage site (ADM’s and artillery rounds) just northeast of Fulda. The 14th Cavalry was assigned responsibility for external security and periodic escort as well as evacuation of the weapons in event of threatened or actual hostilities. Obviously, these additional missions complicated and expanded the already extensive obligations of the regiment.

   (2) A reconnaissance troop was designated “Border Operations Troop” on a monthly basis. This troop manned the outposts and furnished the ground surveillance patrols (a scout section of two jeeps with mounted and armed machine guns). The remainder of the regiment conducted training and met its obligations concerning the nuclear weapons site.

   (3) There were three OP’s on the border: Alpha in the 1st Squadron sector and India and Romeo in the 3rd Squadron sector. The key outpost was Alpha centered in the “Fulda Gap”,  the historic invasion route from the East. During my time there was a wooden tower and a Quonset hut on Alpha; in late 1968 I built some hardstand.  (Later a concrete tower, several buildings, a helipad, and additional hardstand were built.)  A minimum of three soldiers were required in the tower at all times – 24 hours a day and 365 days a year. It was my policy that, to the degree possible, all missions would be executed by a tactical unit; i.e., instead of sending “personnel” to man Alpha, I assigned a reconnaissance platoon with all organic vehicles. The platoon rotated weekly.

   (4) The border itself was traversed once daily by ground patrols and twice daily (weather permitting) by helicopter patrols. Many times the helicopter had to return to base because of weather and frequently had to make an emergency landing in some field as it was not unusual for the weather to suddenly close in forward and behind. Sometimes in these cases the helicopter crew spent the rest of the day and the night waiting for the possibility of returning to base.

   (5) During my time no personnel other than the 14th Cavalry and the Bundesgrenschultz were allowed within 5 km of the border unless authorized and escorted by one of these two elements – this included even CINCUSAREUR who had to stop at the 14th Cavalry headquarters and transfer to one of our helicopters flown by a “Border Qualified Pilot”. This applied likewise to Bundeswehr units and personnel. On one occasion I escorted a German four-star general on a tour of our border area. I was told this was the first. In several ways it was a significant political event and was very close-hold – to the extent that he had to wear civilian clothes!

   (6) It was not unusual for East Germans to attempt to escape westward in our sector. When we found them on our side of the fence, we turned them over to the Bundesgrenschultz where they were processed. Sometimes they were wounded by East German border guards and lay moaning, hollering, and bleeding in the “no-man’s zone”. We were not allowed to cross the fence to their rescue; we could only encourage them to crawl to our fence at which point we could help. If they did not reach us, the East Germans would wait until nightfall and then remove the wounded – or dead body as the case might be – to their zone.

   (7) On three occasions, East German (Soviet?) helicopters attempted to force one of our patrol helicopters across the border and/or force a landing. In one instance, they succeeded resulting in a major flap all the way to Washington. The Soviets insisted that our pilots had violated their border; our pilots insisted they were forced over the border to avoid a collision. Their story was ultimately accepted in Washington. The East released the helicopter and the pilots.

   (8) Frequently (monthly?), the regiment moved to forward battle positions designed for executing our covering force mission along the fronts of the V US Corps and the II GE Corps. Some were alerts ordered by higher headquarters, usually without warning, and others were practice alerts I was authorized to call.

   (9) Once, at the time of the Czech crisis, the Eighth Guards Army was reinforced by two divisions from the north and moved into forward positions along our front, positioned to attack into the Fulda Gap. In the south, along the Czech border, the US troops were told to “remain in place”; but no such instructions were given to me. I decided that I would not take the chance of being another “Pearl Harbor” so I moved the regimental advance headquarters and the combat elements of the 1st and 3rd Squadrons to battle positions and required the US dependents in Fulda and Bad Hersfield to prepare for evacuation. I reported my actions after completion of the move – purposely! The State Department shit in their drawers! General Polk, CINCUSAREUR, officially stated it was within my recognized authority but chastised me publicly for not reporting my decision immediately (in which case it would have been overruled) but patted me on the back privately and insured that no derogative report would be put in my record. A while later General Polk selected me as his Executive Officer in Heidelberg!

    (10) The late 1960’s and 1970’s were very difficult times for our army. Anti-Vietnam activism, which frequently translated into anti-military emotions in our society, was rampant. All this was compounded by racial animosities and a growing pervasive drug culture stemming from the misapplied liberalism of the early 1960’s. These problems of our society certainly complicated and hindered the execution of the job our country asked us to do in Fulda. Nevertheless, in Fulda, we were a smidgen better off than most other units in the US and Germany; we  had an operational mission and less opportunity – even inclination – for the troopers to lose themselves. Still, race and drugs were a serious and difficult problem in the 14th Cavalry of that day – more than I would have believed possible from the army I learned to know during my earlier career as a commander in World War II and Korea.

   (11) The morale and discipline problems were exacerbated by the dearth of experienced officers. The country sent most experienced officers to Vietnam and then home to serve; in fact, I was an exception in that I was called (and volunteered) to come directly from a Vietnam tour to command the regiment in Fulda – instead of going home.  Many newly commissioned officers came to Germany for a short tour (usually 12-18 months) and then departed for Vietnam. Although there were colonels and lieutenant colonels at regimental and squadron command levels, staffs and troops and platoons were manned by green lieutenants. When an officer served long enough to be a senior lieutenant (comparatively speaking!) and become a troop commander, he had only one or two months left before departing for Vietnam. This was not conducive to troop order, morale, training, or discipline.

   (12) At this point I decided to select a lieutenant for troop command after he had been with us about six months, hopefully long enough for me to evaluate his potential. In this fashion, I increased the time an officer was a troop commander generally to eight to ten months, providing a better opportunity to develop the officer and the troopers under his command. This meant I had to shift lieutenants around since I could not put a junior lieutenant in command of a senior (in terms of a month or so) lieutenant. So there were complaints; many officers wanted to get their “tickets punched” and considered my policy unfair, discriminatory,   improper. My goal was better troops and better soldiers, not “punching tickets” of junior officers; besides, getting their “tickets punched” under fire in Vietnam was a much more productive procedure in the long run. There was an IG investigation of their complaints, and the IG was sympathetic to their “problems”.  However, my policy was backed by higher authority. Allegedly, some senior officer said, “If it works, back St John; if it doesn’t work, fire St John!”. Generally speaking, my system constituted an improvement.

   (13) There was one good side to all of this. The shortage of experienced commissioned officers was counter-balanced to a large extent by a good supply of experienced and highly competent non-commissioned officers, enlisted personnel who had served several tours in combat units in Germany. In many ways, I relied on these NCO’s to teach and advise the officers.  My command  sergeant majors Louis Talbot and John Miller were top examples as was First Sergeant Paul Henry who filled in at times as Acting Regimental Sergeant Major. So, there was some good with the bad and vice versa.

    (14) My final year in command was the first year of Project Partnership, a program started by USAREUR to encourage and reward US military cooperation and coordination with German units and with the German people.  On assuming command in 1967, I had continued and perhaps even expanded many German-American activities which had been underway for years in the Fulda area. These included additional exercises with German units to our north alongside of whom  we might have to fight, expansion of a soldier-on-the-farm program, and so on. Hence, the Suivez Moi regiment had a leg up on the program before my time and before USAREUR headquarters thought of it!  (In fairness it should be noted at this point that the !4th Armored Cavalry Regiment was honored earlier on 26 January 1966 by Ambassador George McGhee who presented a State Department  award recognizing the regiment’s significant contributions to German-American relations; this is the first such award to a US Army unit in history.)  The 1969 Year awards were presented in Heidelberg by General Polk, the CINCUSAREUR,  personally. The 14th Cavalry won a first place in every category for which it was eligible to compete. The regiment won first place in the regiment/brigade level, first place in the squadron/battalion level (3rd Squadron), first place in the troop/company level (a troop of the 3rd Squadron), and first place in the Individual Award category (St John). At this same ceremony, Walter Sandner, the Fulda Public Affairs Officer and the “Regimental S5” received the “Outstanding Civil Service Medal”. He was the first German national to be so honored.

   (15) It was a great period in the history of the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and it was a great opportunity for me to share in the accomplishments of this great regiment. For this service I received the 2nd Oak Leaf Cluster to the US Legion of Merit as well as the Silver Medal of the German Reservisten. According to the Fuldaer Zeitung of 23 May 69, I “was the first American soldier to wear the highest decoration of the Bundeswehr Reservists Association” (at this time the Bundeswehr itself could not award decorations or medals).